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Some Skeptical Comments on Beth Simmons’s Mobilizing for Human Rights
Eric A. Posner1

Abstract. These comments address some theoretical, empirical, and normative claims
made by Beth Simmons in her book, Mobilizing for Human Rights. The empirical heart of
the book is rigorous, but because of the shallowness of the data and the limits of the
empirical methodology, the implications for human rights law are narrow and to a large
extent ambiguous.

Beth Simmons makes three types of claims in her book: theoretical, empirical, and
normative. While I admire the project and the methodological scrupulousness with which she
carried it out, I found myself skeptical about all three types of claims. In this brief comment, I
will explain why.
I. Theory
A. Why Do States Enter Human Rights Treaties?
Simmons proposes two theories—one explaining why states enter human rights treaties
and another explaining why they comply with human rights treaties. Her first theory, which she
calls a theory of “rationally expressive commitment,” is that “governments are more likely to
ratify rights treaties they believe in and with which they can comply at a reasonable cost than
those they oppose or find threatening” (64).
Simmons argues that this theory predicts that liberal democracies will enter human
rights treaties, while authoritarian states will not enter human rights treaties. The puzzle is then
why not all liberal states enter human rights treaties, and why not all authoritarian states avoid
entering human rights treaties. Her answer is that some liberal states do not enter human
rights treaties because they face legislative hurdles, federalism, and judicial constraints—all of
which raise the domestic costs of ratification. Meanwhile, authoritarian states enter human
rights treaties because they expect benefits of some sort, make mistakes, or are governed by
leaders who face an end‐game and thus discount the long‐term costs from entering such
treaties.
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So much for the theory; is it plausible? The main problem with it is that it does not in
fact explain why liberal democracies would enter a human rights treaty. A state will enter a
treaty only if the perceived benefits exceed the costs. Simmons focuses on the cost side,
plausibly arguing that a state that enters a treaty that does not require it to change its behavior
does not face any cost. But she does not explain what such a state gains from entering a human
rights treaty. And given that there are political costs from entering treaties, as she discusses (for
example, the opportunity cost from going through ratification rather than engaging in other
government action), her theory suggests that no liberal democracy should enter a treaty.
Another puzzling element of the theory is the role that the common law plays in it.
Simmons says the common law states face higher ex post costs from ratifying treaties than non‐
common law (let’s say, civil law) states do. One reason she gives is that in common law states,
judicial independence exists. But not all common law systems feature judicial independence,
and many civil law systems do feature judicial independence. It would thus be better to treat
judicial independence as a separate variable. But in any event it is not clear which way judicial
independence cuts. Independent judges may insist that states comply with a treaty against a
government’s wishes (thus raising ex post costs); but they might also refuse to enforce treaties
(reducing ex post costs). Simmons needs to explain why independent judges would act the way
she thinks they would act.
Simmons says that treaties are “more of a foreign substance” (p. 72) in a common law
system than in a civil law system. I am not sure what she means by this statement but a few
comments are in order. First, remember that U.S. federal courts have very limited common law
powers; they mostly enforce statutes. Second, common law systems are filled with codes, and
common law judges understand how codes work. Indeed, a treaty is no more foreign to a
common law judge than a statute is. Third, there is no reason to believe that common law
judges must undergo more “attitude adjustment” (72) than civil law judges. As I noted,
common law judges are used to dealing with statutes and, for that matter, treaties. (The U.S. is
a party to far more treaties than any other country.) Statutes that abolish common law
precedents are common, and treaties are no more problematic than they are.
Simmons further argues that a common law court’s interpretation of a treaty is less
predictable than a civil law judge’s is, again raising the cost of entering treaties for
governments. I would say the opposite. It is easy to predict how common law judges act
because one can look at the reasoning in previously decided cases, which explains why the
judges interpreted treaties one way or the other. One cannot do this for civil law judges.
Finally, Simmons argues that in common law systems treaties are irreversible. However,
a state that enters a treaty can easily reverse it just by enacting a statute. This is true in
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common law systems, and mostly true in civil law systems. There is no reason to believe that a
common law court would stop a state from exiting a treaty.
I understand that Simmons finds strong results for the common law, in line with other
scholars who have used that variable in cross‐country regressions. But if she cannot provide a
persuasive theory for why the common law should matter for treaty ratification, then worries
arise that the correlations are spurious.
B. Why Do States Comply with Human Rights Treaties?
The second part of Simmons’s theory addresses why states comply with human rights
treaties. She calls her theory “a domestic politics” theory of compliance: “treaties are causally
meaningful to the extent that they empower individuals, groups, or parts of the state with
different rights preferences that were not empowered to the same extent in the absence of the
treaties” (125).
She identifies three mechanisms: (1) for most countries, the creation of a treaty is
exogenous, so it sets the agenda, forcing a government to take a stand on a potentially
embarrassing issue; (2) treaties create litigation opportunities for domestic groups; (3) treaty
ratification encourages domestic groups to lobby for reform by revealing to them that some
people in government support their commitments, and thus that their probability of prevailing
in domestic politics is higher than they had previously thought.
I like the focus on domestic politics, but I wonder whether it really improves on more
conventional “black box” theories that treat states’ interests as essentially fixed and exogenous.
With respect to the first mechanism, if a country helped create the treaty, then the treaty was
already on the agenda before international negotiations. If the country is a passive recipient,
the question is why a government finds it harder to say “no” to domestic groups when a treaty
exists than when it does not exist. After all, except in the most repressive states, domestic
groups can (and do) influence the agenda by proposing that the country adopt domestic human
rights protections. They do not need to wait for a treaty, and indeed rarely do.
As for litigation, although Simmons cites various examples of the use of litigation to
enforce treaties, and some academic work, I am skeptical. The problem here is that when states
ratify treaties, they retain the option to decide whether or not to create judicially enforceable
rights. In dualist states, the government usually must enact implementing legislation. In monist
states, the government usually may enact legislation that bars domestic enforcement. Thus, the
litigation mechanism is ultimately question‐begging. If we want to understand why a state
complies with a treaty, we cannot just cite the risk of litigation, because then we must ask why
the state decides to comply with a treaty by creating judicially enforceable rights.
4

The mobilization mechanism also suffers from circularity. People who care about, say,
stopping torture might be governed by leaders who share their view, who do not share their
view, or who are divided. If the leaders oppose torture as well, then they will stop torture
whether or not a treaty exists. If the leaders are divided about torture, then surely domestic
anti‐torture groups will know this, and they will not learn anything from the ratification of the
Convention Against Torture. If the leaders approve of torture, but nonetheless ratify the
Convention Against Torture, it is possible that the domestic anti‐torture groups will falsely
believe that in fact the leaders reject torture, and mobilize, possibly producing some positive
effect. It is only in this last case that the mobilization theory makes any logical sense, but is it
plausible? Don’t domestic groups know about the torture (that is why they form in the first
place) and won’t they believe that the leaders have no intention of complying with the treaty?
II. Empirics
I will pass over the empirical tests of the ratification theory, and turn to the empirical
tests of the compliance theory, which form the bulk of the book. Simmons argues that the
results are consistent with her hypothesis that ratification of human rights treaties causes
states to improve what I will loosely call “human rights outcomes.” Of course, as she notes,
there are a number of exceptions—notably for torture. But there are other reasons to question
the results, as I will discuss.
A. What Is Compliance?
In older debates about human rights treaties, discussions centered around the question
of compliance. Do states that enter human rights treaties comply with them? Skepticism was
based on anecdotal evidence—a country like Hungary could enter the ICCPR in 1974 and not in
any obvious way change its behavior. It remained a totalitarian dictatorship until communism
collapsed in 1989. Simmons asks a different question: whether ratification of a human rights
treaty has a causal effect on a state’s human rights outcomes. The question is then whether
human rights outcomes after ratification exceed human rights outcomes prior to ratification, all
else equal.
To understand the difference between these approaches, imagine that two countries
agree to settle a border dispute by drawing a line through the disputed territory. “Compliance”
means that the states stop sending troops into the area on the other side of the line.
“Causation” means that the states send fewer troops into the area on the other side of the line
than they did before they entered the treaty. It should be clear that a treaty could be a failure
even if it has causal effect. If troop movements decline only a little, and the dispute between
the states over the border region is not resolved, the treaty may well be regarded as a failure
despite its causal effect.
5

Let us consider a human rights treaty. If a country enters the CAT, and the number of
people tortured goes down from 100,000 per year to 50,000 per year, there is (arguable)
causation, but not compliance. This counts as success in Simmons’s empirics, not as failure.
Which is the right perspective? It depends on what you care about. If the question is
whether international law and human rights treaties in particular ever affect behavior, then all
we care about is causation. If the question is whether states comply with human rights treaties,
then we care about compliance.
Interestingly, Simmons’s results are probably more dramatic for political scientists than
for lawyers. For political scientists, where realism has long been a dominant perspective, it is
surprising when states comply with treaties. So in political science, Simmons’s results are
dramatic. But for lawyers, the opposite is true, well represented by Louis Henkin’s famous claim
that “almost all nations observe almost all principles of international law and almost all of their
obligations almost all of the time.”2 Simmons’s results, which show modest causal effects but
not compliance, hardly seem consistent with this view; indeed, they seem to falsify it.
I will say more about this distinction when I talk about the normative implications of
Simmons’s work.
1. What is the dependent variable? What do the coefficients tell us?
Simmons uses a range of dependent variables that measure different human rights
outcomes. Unfortunately, many of these variables do not have intuitive meaning, so it is
difficult to interpret the results.
Take religious freedom. The dependent variable is a dummy variable: 0 (restrictive) or 1
(free). We are told that government practices that count as restrictive include “prohibitions on
proselytizing, prohibitions on clergies’ political participation; ... harassment and/or intimidation
for religious beliefs and practices” (p. 386). This definition is so general as to be meaningless. In
virtually every country, restrictions exist on religious behavior; whether they rise to the level of
“harassment” is often in the eye of the beholder.
A graph on p. 173 shows that religious freedom has actually stayed about the same
during the period of study, 1981‐2005. It has hovered around 0.7, which means that about 70
percent of countries receive a “1” during this period, while treaty ratifications have increased
from less than 50 percent to more than 80 percent. There is no clear correlation between treaty
ratification and religious freedom.
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Nonetheless, Simmons finds that at a statistically significant level countries with an
ICCPR commitment have more religious freedom. The coefficient is .08, which means that when
a country ratifies the ICCPR, the probability that religious freedom will increase from 0 to 1 is
eight percent. How should we understand this coefficient? Does religious freedom increase
significantly or trivially when a state ratifies the ICCPR?
There are two problems with answering this question. The first is that religious freedom
is a continuous function, which cannot be captured fully in a dichotomous variable. It is possible
that the states that move from 0 to 1 when they ratify the treaty are states that barely fall short
of receiving a 1 before they ratify the treaty and barely deserve a 1 after they ratify the treaty.
Thus, their improvement is marginal. The second is that we have no intuitive sense of what it
means for 8 percent of states to improve their behavior. Is this amount large enough to justify
the costs of entering the treaty in the first place? I will return to this question in Part III.
2. Selection effects.
Simmons examines all human rights treaties, which collectively contain dozens or
maybe even hundreds of provisions, yet she tests only a handful. How did she select them?
This question is important because if the provisions Simmons tests do not fairly
represent all of the provisions in all of her treaties, her results will be biased. Suppose, for
example, that Simmons tests only those provisions most likely to influence states’ behavior.
Then her coefficients—the representation of the causal effect of the provisions that she tests—
will exaggerate the actual effect of the human rights treaties considered as a whole.
Ideally, Simmons would select her provisions randomly. That might be too much to ask,
since many provisions would be difficult to test. But if she did not select them randomly, how
did she select them? One concern is that she was drawn to provisions that require agencies
produce human rights outcomes that are easily measurable so as to facilitate empirical analysis,
which requires measurable outcomes. An example is the death penalty: the number of people
formally executed by the state is public information in nearly all countries. The problem with
this approach is that countries may well be less likely to comply with provisions that do not
require easily measurable outcomes—precisely because observers cannot easily tell whether
the state has complied with the treaty term. Indeed, there is an even worse possibility: that
states that enter human rights treaties improve their behavior along measurable dimensions
while worsening their behavior along unmeasurable dimensions, so that overall human rights
outcomes stay the same or even decline. The state that abolishes the death penalty in
conformity with the second optional protocol of the ICCPR might permit local police to take up
the slack by engaging in extrajudicial killings, which are extremely hard to measure because
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police can disguise them as accidents or unsolvable crimes committed by unknown private
individuals.
At the conference, Simmons said that she addressed this problem by choosing “hard”
provisions, citing the Convention Against Torture. But it is not clear what she means by hard
provisions. The point is that the only way to address this problem is to test treaty provisions
that require states to produce unmeasurable human rights outcomes, but of course if the
outcomes are unmeasurable, then an empirical test cannot be performed.
3. Reverse causation.
Regression analysis must always address the question of reverse causation. Simmons
shows certain correlations—between treaty ratification and human rights outcomes—but
correlation does not mean causation. The correlations are consistent with Simmons’s
hypothesis—that ratification causes improvement in human rights outcomes—but also with the
opposite—that states that improve their human rights performance will enter human rights
treaties. Indeed, the reverse hypothesis is consistent with Simmons’s theory of ratification,
which holds that states are more likely to ratify treaties when the cost of compliance is low.
To address reverse causation, Simmons uses three instrumental variables: common law
system, regional ratification, and ratification hurdles (p. 172).3 An instrumental variable is a
variable that is correlated with the independent variable but not directly with the dependent
variable. For example, Simmons argues that common law is a good instrumental variable
because, as her first set of regressions established, states with common law systems are less
likely to enter treaties, while there is no reason to believe that states with common law systems
would be more (or less) likely to comply with treaties. Simmons makes similar arguments for
regional ratification and ratification hurdles.
But using these variables as instrumental variables is questionable. The reason that
Simmons gives for assuming that governments of common law countries are reluctant to enter
treaties is that they fear that their own courts will interpret them too strictly or in the wrong
way. But that means that the common law system will have a direct causal impact on human
rights outcomes, which violates the assumptions of instrumental variable analysis.
Simmons argues that regional ratification is a good instrumental variable because it is
correlated with treaty ratification, while there is no reason to assume that a state is more likely
to improve its human rights outcomes as a result of the human rights performance of its
neighbors. However, Simmons believes that neighbors pressure each other to enter human
rights treaties; if neighbors influence the ratification decision, why wouldn’t they also influence
3
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the decision to improve human rights outcomes? Again, the theoretical basis for assuming that
regional ratification is correlated with the independent variable turns out to provide reason for
believing that regional ratification is correlated with the dependent variable as well.
Simmons’s third instrumental variable—ratification hurdles—is more plausible. It is
plausible that ratification hurdles are correlated with treaty ratification because states that face
high hurdles will have trouble ratifying treaties, while there is no obvious reason to believe that
a state that can ratify treaties only with difficulty because of its constitutional system would
also find it easy or difficult to improve its human rights outcomes. But there are reasons to
worry. For example, suppose that the ratification process for countries does not differ much
from the general legislative process and hence the difficulty of enacting ordinary statutes. For
example, the U.S. government faces high hurdles in both making treaties and enacting statutes,
while the UK government faces low hurdles in both cases. If this is so, then one would predict
that states that face hurdles in entering human rights treaties would also face hurdles in
improving human rights outcomes through legislation, which would violate the assumptions
necessary for instrumental variable analysis.
4. Omitted variables.
Consider an intuitive explanation for Simmons’s results. Dozens of states over the last
forty years have undergone transitions from authoritarianism to liberal democracy. The
transitions themselves had many causes: the influence of liberal neighbors in Europe for Spain,
Portugal, and Greece in the 1970s; the collapse of the Soviet Union in the 1990s, which freed
satellites in Eastern Europe to pursue western policies; the delegitimation of authoritarian rule
in Latin America; and so on. As the countries adopted liberal constitutional forms and policies,
they ratified human rights treaties. Formally, Simmons’s two variables—treaty ratification and
human rights outcomes—were jointly caused by an omitted variable, reflecting some historical
or cultural process that cannot be directly observed.
Ironically, this theory recalls Simmons’s own expressive theory of ratification: states
liberalize for other reasons and then express their new commitment by entering human rights
treaties. But on this alternative account, the treaties have no causal effect. They are not
necessary to mobilize groups because the groups are already mobilized—they are the ones who
caused the state to enter the treaties in the first place.
B. Arbitrary Division of the Population.
Suppose I am trying to test whether a pill makes people smarter. I test everyone who
takes the pill, and I don’t get a statistically significant result. Then I divide the population into 10
groups, and find that one group is positive. I then look for what is unique about the group—say
they have green eyes. And I claim that I should be able to market my pill to people with green
9

eyes. The FDA would not permit me to do so. The problem is that a small segment of a large
population will exhibit a correlation between the dependent variable and some other variable
or variables at a statistically significant level as a result of pure chance. That is why the tester
must identify the variables of interest in advance, on the basis of an accepted theory.
In testing the effect of human rights treaties on states’ behavior, a natural starting point
is the theory—common enough among lawyers—that treaties would improve the behavior of
all states. Simmons’s results are consistent with this hypothesis for a few treaty provisions, but
overall they are weak. It is when Simmons subdivides the population of states that her results
become stronger. It turns out that human rights improvements can be seen not so much in all
states, but in transitional states, or middle‐income states, or states with the rule of law, or
states with state religions. The question then is whether these results are spurious—in the
same sense as the green‐eye results in my pill example—or valid.
Simmons argues that she did not subdivide the states arbitrarily but on the basis of her
theory. I have already expressed some doubts about her theory of compliance, but the broader
problem is that her theory of compliance does not really predict that transitional (or middle‐
income, or rule‐of‐law states, etc.) will be more influenced by human rights treaty ratification
than other types of states. Her main explanations for compliance—agenda‐setting, litigation,
and mobilization—do not identify factors that one would expect to vary according to whether a
state is transitional or not. For example, mobilization is just as likely to occur in a democratic
state as in a transitional state, and indeed even in an authoritarian state unless it is totalitarian
and no civil society is tolerated.
III. Normative Implications
Many political scientists restrict themselves to descriptive theory and empirical testing.
Simmons is unusual for her normative commitments (or at least for expressing her normative
commitments) as well. Even while she acknowledges forthrightly the limits of human rights
treaties and the empirical limitations of her study, she celebrates the human rights treaties, and
argues that her empirical results indicate that human rights treaties should be “respected”
(376).
But if we take Simmons to have shown that ratification of human rights treaties causes
states to improve their human rights performance (however minimally), what exactly follows
from that? One possibility—which Simmons seems to have in mind—is that states do not enter
or comply with human rights treaties as much as they might because they falsely believe that
other states never comply with human rights treaties. By correcting this error, Simmons gives
the first group of states reason to enter and comply with human rights treaties. But it seems
doubtful that states think this way.
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Indeed, it is easy to predict an opposite reaction. Perhaps many states believe falsely
that states that enter human rights treaty greatly improve their human rights performance.
Simmons’s results tell them that their belief is false. Thus, the first group of states might
conclude that they should not enter and comply with human rights treaties if other states do
not take them very seriously.
Another problem with Simmons’s normative argument relates back to my comment
about the magnitudes of the coefficients in her regressions. If the question is whether “we” or
states or other entities should invest in encouraging other states to enter and comply with
human rights treaties, Simmons’s empirical results provides an ambiguous answer. We all have
limited resources, and if the result of all this effort is that it becomes a few percentage points
more likely that a state will improve human rights outcomes, we should ask whether our
resources might be better used in some other way. And if states do not improve their overall
human rights outcomes, but merely switch from less measurable to more measurable
outcomes, then our resources are being wasted.
Many countries, for example, China, argue that they cannot comply with the negative
rights in the ICCPR and other treaties because their main agenda is to reduce poverty and
maintain order. Although some academics, like Amartya Sen,4 reject the view that human rights
and development are incompatible, China’s view is at least plausible and may well be right.
Many authoritarian countries followed a successful path to development, and then liberalized
only after they had achieved an acceptable standard of living for their people.
Why might development and compliance with human rights be incompatible? One
possible reason is that development often requires wrenching changes in existing customs and
rights. Property rights that evolved in a quasi‐feudal or traditional agricultural society block
development of a commercial economy, which requires the transformation of property into
alienable, measurable, recorded plots of land. A democratic system may find it difficult or
impossible to convert the economic system; an authoritarian system may not. A country that
scrupulously obeys human rights prohibitions on taking property without compensation,
moving populations, arbitrary detention, and the like, may find it difficult to achieve a modern
stage of development.
Human rights treaties pose problems even for countries that do not have authoritarian
systems but a reasonably responsive democratic governments. All countries must make
tradeoffs; for poor countries, these tradeoffs can be particularly wrenching. Consider a simple
example in which a poor country faces two major problems: local police who engage in torture
and an inadequate system of schools. The country has limited resources, and could end torture
4
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only by depriving the schools of any money. Is that a proper use of resources? Arguably, not.
Yet the human rights treaties, as normally interpreted, would obligate the country to end
torture, while requiring it only to take reasonable steps toward funding schools. A country that
complied with those rules might be much worse off, especially in the long run, than a country
that disregarded them.
One might argue that human rights treaties do not block this tradeoff. After all, the
ICESCR directs states to improve education. A state might seek to excuse its poor performance
under the CAT by claiming that it is improving under the ICESCR. Most human rights lawyers
would reject this type of argument because if it were accepted, human rights treaties would
have no critical force at all. Outside the most obvious kleptocracies, governments can and do
plead that they are doing the best under difficult conditions, and if they were to devote more
resources to a problem like torture singled out by human rights campaigners, they would make
no progress or even backslide on many other problems that are just as significant. If these
arguments are correct, then Simmons’s empirical results are hardly grounds for optimism. They
show that governments of poor countries shift around their resources to please the west, but
not in a way that necessarily improves the well‐being of their populations.5
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